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Three decades ago, Jean-François Lyotard famously declared that in ‘contemporary society and culture… the grand narrative has lost its credibility’ (Lyotard 1984, p. 37) but Professors Barden and Murphy don’t seem to have been convinced. This hugely ambitious, very thoughtful book is certainly in the grand narrative business. Offering far more than a philosophy of law in any familiar modern sense, the authors sketch an elaborate wide-ranging social philosophy – a view of the nature of society and community, of justice, ownership and rights, law and morality, legislation and adjudication. In earlier ages of scholarship this might have been called their philosophical ‘system’ – in this case, it is a systematic view of an entire expanse of interrelated problems of how human beings can and should live together within a legal and moral framework that promotes the ‘common good’.

Barden and Murphy note that their theory is ‘grounded in… anthropological, economic, philosophical, and theological thought as well as legal or juridical reflection’ (p12). Interestingly, sociology is not included in this list and not invoked in the book. Theology is represented in the strong influence of aspects of Aquinas’ thought. Anthropological literature enters most obviously via a single long footnote on the place of law in Evans-Pritchard’s studies of the Nuer and the Azande. Ideas about economic organisation are certainly present, in Barden and Murphy’s discussion of justice in connection with what they call the ‘trading order’, the realm of market relations. But, in general, explicit discussions of empirical social science are outside the book’s scope. We are dealing here purely with philosophy: social philosophy with law at the heart of its concerns. And it is a system of thought worth examining with care because of the authors’ sustained effort to develop rigorous argument based on precise definitions of key concepts.

The book begins with an outline of their view of the nature of human society in which they locate the central place of law, understood in a way strikingly at odds with mainstream approaches of contemporary positivist legal philosophy. Then come three important chapters on the nature of justice, followed by a series of relatively short chapters on adjudication and legal interpretation, legislation, rights, and force and authority in law, as well as brief reflections on natural law interpreted as a mode of deliberation about ‘the good’, a mode of deliberation which Barden and Murphy see as consistent with the approach of the book as a whole and in harmony with Aquinas’ view of natural law. It involves reflection on the intrinsic nature of actions and situations, to reveal the moral responsibilities and expectations inherent in them.

Society, for Barden and Murphy, is ‘an original unchosen but given social order’ (p. 29). ‘We suggest that humans originally live together in community and that civil society is, therefore, a spontaneous order constituted by the natural sociability of humans’ (p. 13). States may sometimes be created through convention or agreement (especially after war), but societies never are. An important object of Barden’s and Murphy’s attack is any version of social contract theory suggesting an origin of society in agreement. They deny that there could be any pre-social condition of human existence from which people create society: ‘civil society is not chosen by a founding contract between those living outside it. It is an order into which humans are born, as they have always been born, without any original choice’ (p. 21). 

Why are these speculations on the ‘unchosen’ character of society so important? The main answer, which becomes clear as the book proceeds, is (i) that the authors want to associate law, in some protean sense, directly with society (so that the legal and the social are in their foundations inseparable) and (ii) that they want, as a consequence of this approach, to be able to present law itself as, in its most fundamental forms, equally ‘unchosen’ and spontaneous; the natural normative essence of ‘sociability’, which is the necessary condition in which humans must live. 

The discussion of society paves the way for the presentation of this view of law. The idea of entitlement is crucial and echoes through the rest of the book. ‘Human societies are networks of entitlements or rights’ (p. xiv) and law establishes entitlements which (contrary to familiar modern usage) can be entitlements to detriments as well as benefits. When justice is introduced in Chapter 3 it is presented as the guarantee of entitlements. Justice is a rendering to each of what is their due (pp. 30, 40). Since society consists of entitlements, it seems that the idea of society and the idea of entitlement arise simultaneously. The whole thrust of the argument is to deny a role for deliberate human agency in the making of society as a whole.

This is far from being without consequence. One important reason for rejecting social contract theory, according to the authors, is that this theory has encouraged a view of society as an organisation, and ‘this has led in turn to a focus on how society  should be organised and what means should be used to organise it’ (p. 19). Could this be a bad thing? Barden and Murphy never claim that contemporary society cannot or should not be organised in any way, but they note late in the book, when discussing legislation, that its scope is ‘large and difficult to contain’ (p. 179) and they strongly emphasise its coercive rather than power-conferring aspects. Legislation is ‘a command that is intended to oblige those to whom it applies; it seeks to direct and thus exert control over their activities’; through it, ‘the state acquires entitlements or rights vis-à-vis those it commands’ (p. 178). What might appear an odd view of legislation as entitling the state against the citizen, seems to portray it as outside the social; potentially at odds with the authors’ main image of law as integral to society.

The image of law embedded in society is expressed in terms of what they call ‘living law’. Living law, law’s most fundamental form, consists of ‘those judgments and choices that in recurrent kinds of circumstances are generally accepted and approved in a particular community’ (pp. 3, 15). Though the legal sociologist Eugen Ehrlich’s famous concept of living law, the best known invocation of this terminology, is discussed briefly, Barden and Murphy’s living law is certainly not Ehrlich’s. Ehrlich (2002) was clear that living law was not morality as such and that only some of the norms regulating social associations should be seen as law (though his methods of separating law from non-legal social norms were hardly adequate). But Barden and Murphy write of living law not only as ‘the communal law’ (p. 3) but also as ‘the commonly accepted moral rules of the community’ (pp. 4, 7). Essentially, there seems no differentiation in their view of living law between mere custom, community morality, and what legal sociologists and others might recognise as types of non-state law. Living law, it seems, is a way of talking in normative terms about social life – community and society being treated as synonyms (p. 1). Living law establishes entitlements and gives rise to the sense of justice. So it is not just rooted in society but expresses society’s ultimate normative character. Law, in the more usual juristic senses of the word, builds on this or emerges out of it. But Barden and Murphy never clearly indicate at what point, analytically speaking, law can be identified as distinct from the moral or the customary, or whether they think it needs to be. In any case, when law develops from spontaneous to more positivistic forms, as judicial decision and legislation, these – they suggest – must have roots in living law.

Barden and Murphy insist that they are not relativists. The living law of a community can be judged as good or bad; communal consensus is not enough to validate it. They argue that through inquiry and intelligent reflection the natural principles underlying social phenomena can be rationally discovered. Ultimately, for example, it is rational for contracts to be honoured, for a promise to create an obligation, for a loan to be returned. While much that is proper and just can be settled by convention, ‘specific mutual entitlements’ are ‘intrinsic to specific practices’ (p. 69), arising from their nature. Hence a method of reflection to discover the ‘intrinsic’, applied generally (as the true method of natural law) to communal life can determine its fundamental principles. If many societies do not follow out this process of discovery sufficiently, Barden and Murphy argue that it does lead to the consequence that, in general, living law ‘tends to cultivate a moral context within which others’ interests are to be considered’ (p. 27), a context in which people are ‘self-interested’ but not ‘selfish’ (p. 263). 

The whole of the rest of the book is a working through and development of these principles, with justice as fundamentally a framework for this unselfish self-interest, in which people legitimately insist on their due and favour their own concerns, but are no less willing to ensure the entitlements of others, and to take account of them in their own actions. Where the process of reflection on one’s own and others’ entitlements does not produce agreement, adjudication is necessary; a third-party judge will be required. The task of the judge is to carry through the processes of deliberation and reflection that the parties have not been able to pursue effectively. The task of the legislator, it seems, is similar but on a larger scale. It is for particular societies to decide how far the reach of legislation should extend in order to realise, through deliberate rule-making, the common good that the protection of entitlements through law and justice aims to secure.

In the trading order (networks of economic exchanges), the idea of unselfish pursuit of self-interest is especially significant. Justice in exchange is not about the relations of haves and have-nots, or distribution and redistribution, but about fair dealing in fulfilling the choices made by trading partners. And ‘choice’ is taken in a strictly limited sense. For Barden and Murphy all morality is about the choices and deliberations of individuals (which, if they are generally made in the same way will form a community morality or living law). But no account is taken of pressures of need or circumstance that may shape choices, so inequalities in market position are extrinsic matters outside the scope of the discussion of justice and the essential character of the trading order. Barden’s and Murphy’s view is simply that each society decides in its own way (a matter presumably outside the purview of a social philosophy of law, and certainly outside their discussion) what, if any, adjustments to make to the conditions in which people make choices in the market.

In fact, throughout the book, a set of decisions is presented by the authors, step by step, as to what should be part of the theory and what should not; what is central and what peripheral; what needs philosophical conceptualisation and what is to be left aside for empirical inquiry (by social scientists, historians?) in particular contexts. This approach (inevitable in orienting the theory) might not matter if all that was being presented was a theory of law. One could treat it, like any legal theory, as a partial perspective on law to be put alongside other such perspectives. But social philosophy runs the risk of seeming ideological the more extensive its reach and its claims to describe the nature of social reality, and the more specific its view that the nature of society in general is, so to speak, ‘like this, rather than like that.’ Social philosophy is a dangerous game, insofar as it presents its armchair vision of the social world and leaves it to others (presumably anyone other than philosophers) to look at the messy detail of empirical social and historical variation.

Despite the real subtlety of argument in this book its social and legal philosophy is clearly slanted in certain ways that emerge even in its choice of starting points. It is surely not inevitable that society’s fundamental nature must be seen as spontaneous rather than a result of specific patterns of human agency. To exclude agency is to exclude, most importantly, systematic discussion of power. Power is mentioned in the book, but always as a matter outside the scope of its social philosophy and always as deserving no more than passing reference. Moral traditions ‘will inevitably be corrupted by individual and group bias’ (pp. 63, 178); ‘in every community, some persons and some groups are more influential than others’ (pp. 64, 178); over time powerful individuals and groups will ‘favour traditions that support and enhance their power over others’ (p. 63). A moral climate in which others’ interests are considered tends to emerge but this is ‘subject to the ordinary range of corrupting human influences’ (p. 54). None of these comments is further elaborated. Perhaps they refer to matters that seem philosophically uninteresting or impenetrable. Similarly, as noted above, economic imbalances in markets are recognised but not discussed, having no bearing on justice in exchange which is the focus of attention.

On the other hand, it is hard to see why the idea of ownership looms so large in the book. There can be no human society without ownership, the authors declare, and this is immediately explained as meaning no society without entitlements (pp. 13, 42). Entitlement and ownership seem synonymous. What can be owned is decided by each society, but the idea of ownership is crucial to society, and so to the authors’ social philosophy. But surely, treating all entitlements (positive and negative) in terms of ownership needs justification. One is entitled not to be molested but must this be thought of as owning one’s bodily integrity? Is it helpful to think (as the authors do) of owning the ‘punishment for a crime of which one has been found guilty’ (p. 42)? Why make ownership conceptually fundamental unless, perhaps, to imply that private property rights are an appropriate model for all entitlements? Certainly, the idea that society or the state could be considered the owner of all wealth is rejected (pp. 44-5).

What warrant can a social philosophy ultimately have for its speculations? Why, for example, will the living law of a society tend to promote the taking of others’ interests into account? Why will self-interest typically be made to reject selfishness? Social theory might emphasise sociological reasons for solidarity, and conditions for and threats to solidarity’s existence, in particular kinds of society. A social science approach would search for empirical variables. But, in the absence of such a search, social philosophy is likely to respond in terms of absolutes. If ‘no one’ acted justly in rendering what was due even if it was inconvenient to do so, Barden and Murphy note, ‘the social order would be utterly destroyed’ (p. 174, and see p. 34), as it would if some values were ‘universally or too largely chosen’ (p. 173). But it seems that philosophy, mainly uninterested in evidence of social variation, cannot judge the consequences (perhaps more nuanced than total societal destruction) of some choices of inappropriate values, or some people acting unjustly. We are left with the big ideal picture facing the unknown empirical social contexts to which it somehow relates. 

One result is that ‘society’ remains opaque and its elements undifferentiated. While the concept of community appears in the title, it has little autonomous significance in the book. As noted earlier, the concepts of society and community are not distinguished, although in much social scientific literature ‘community’ often suggests specially close, intimate, local or relatively distinctive social ties that require explanation. Equally, while the authors recognise that different communities may have different living law systems (e.g. pp. 56-9), the significance of conflict between these is not really explored. But there is a hint that some differences as regards communal moral norms might be ironed out with time (p. 64).

Leaving aside these criticisms (which amount to a lament for a general absence, in social philosophy such as Barden’s and Murphy’s, of empirical social science and empirically-oriented social theory) what remains is a thought-provoking book which sets out, on its own terms, to make an unconventional contribution to debate about the nature of law. It is refreshing to read a discussion that refuses to be confined by the terms of debate of most current Anglophone legal philosophy (indeed largely ignores them) and ranges in its references from Roman juristic thought to the ancient Icelandic ‘Grey Goose’ laws, from Aquinas to Hobbes, from Aristotle to Rawls. It is a pleasure to read an elaborate argument which the authors try to develop with care from their initial premises, controversial though these may be. 

The book may not be quite as original in its key claims as its unusual orientation might suggest. There is surely a lineage here that goes back to aspects of historical jurisprudence and related common law theory,​[1]​ and some discussion of Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice would have been welcome. But, whatever its limitations, this is surely a provocative and imaginative work that deserves to be read and pondered by anyone with an interest in theoretical inquiries about law.
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^1	  See e.g. Carter 1974, p. 320: ‘Law, Custom, Conduct, Life – different names for almost the same thing – are so inseparably blended together that one cannot even be thought of without the other.’
